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I. INTRODUCTION
Mandatory arbitration agreements are becoming popular in many types
of long-term contractual relationships, including employment relationships.
The issue in this case is whether an arbitration agreement that provides for
arbitration of all employment-related disputes, including federal statutory
claims, can be valid and enforceable. In holding that such claims are
generally subject to mandatory arbitration agreements, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit joined several other circuits in
applying the United States Supreme Court's holding of Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation.1 However, the Sixth Circuit made
clear that such a holding does not require a finding that a particular
arbitration agreement is enforceable, since each agreement must still be
evaluated under state contract law. 2
II. FACTS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY, AND HOLDINGS
Kyle Daniels and Sharon Floss were employees of Ryan's Family Steak
Houses, Inc.3 As a condition of employment, both Daniels and Floss were
required to sign an arbitration agreement which would govern all
employment-related disputes.4
* 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000).
I Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The First, Second,
Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all applied Gilmer to questions of whether
certain statutory claims could be arbitrated under mandatory arbitration agreements. E.g.,
Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000) (enforcing arbitration
agreement for Truth in Lending Act and Electronic Funds Transfer Act claims); Williams
v. Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758 (10th Cir. 2000) (enforcing arbitration agreement for ERISA
claims); Desiderio v. NASD, 191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999) (enforcing arbitration
agreement for Title VII claims); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149 (11th
Cir. 1999) (holding that Truth in Lending Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act claims
are generally subject to arbitration); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that ADEA and Title VII claims are generally
subject to arbitration).
2 Floss, 211 F.3d at 314. The court cites specifically to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1994): "The Federal Arbitration Act declares that arbitration agreements
'shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon grounds that exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."' Id.
3 Id. at310.
4 Id. at 309-10. The arbitration agreement is between the employee and a third-party
arbitration services provider, Employment Dispute Services, Inc. ('EDSr'). Id. at 309.
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On August 13, 1997, Daniels was terminated from Ryan's after taking a
medical leave. Daniels filed a claim in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),5 "alleging that Ryan's terminated him on account of his handicapped
status despite his ability to perform the essential functions of his job with or
without reasonable accommodation."'6
Floss left her position at Ryan's on January 23, 1998, as a result of
harassment and intimidation by two of her managers in retaliation for Floss's
complaints to the United States Department of Labor regarding the pay
practices of Ryan's. 7 On February 17, 1998, Floss filed suit against Ryan's in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky,
individually and on behalf of similarly-situated employees, for violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act.8 She alleged that Ryan's did not "pay
employees the legally-required minimum and overtime wages," that Ryan's
"failed to pay employees for certain hours worked," and that Ryan's
"retaliated against her because she complained of these practices to the
United States Department of Labor." 9
In both actions, Ryan's filed motions to compel arbitration under the
arbitration agreement both employees had signed with EDSI. 10 The district
court hearing Daniels' action ruled that the agreement was not enforceable
because there was no consideration, the agreement did not bind EDSI, and
the agreement was not clear enough to represent a knowing and intelligent
waiver of Daniels' right to pursue his ADA claim in court.11 However, the
district court hearing Floss's case enforced the agreement under the Federal
Arbitration Act12 and rejected Floss's argument that "claims under FLSA
could not be made subject to mandatory arbitration. '13 Ryan's appealed the
The agreement states that Ryan's is a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement.
Id. at 310. EDSI is given "complete discretion over [the] arbitration rules and
procedures," and EDSI may modify those rules at any time, without the employee's
consent. Id.
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
6 211 F.3d at 310.
7 Id.
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
9 211 F.3d at 310.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 310-11.
12 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (1994) (authorizing a federal district court to stay any proceeding
and compel arbitration if a matter therein is subject to an arbitration agreement and a
party has filed suit in contravention of that.arbitration agreement).
13 211 F.3d at 311 & n.5.
420
[Vol. 16:2 2001]
FLOSS V. RYAN'S FAMILYSTEAKHOUSES, INC.
holding of the Tennessee district court, and Floss appealed the holding of the
Kentucky district court.14
Reviewing both cases de novo, 15 the Sixth Circuit held that neither
Daniels nor Floss validly waived their right to bring an action in federal
court.1 6 The court held that Floss and Daniels were not "contractually
obligated to submit their federal claims to arbitration in EDSI's arbitral
forum." 17 Specifically, the court found EDSI's promise to provide an arbitral
forum to be "fatally indefinite" and provided insufficient consideration for
the arbitration agreement, since EDSI had reserved the right to alter the
applicable rules and procedures without notification to, or consent from,
Ryan's employees. 18
In dicta, the court also noted that the specific arbitration forum provided
by EDSI might be unsuitable for the resolution of statutory claims. 19 First,
the court noted that the forum might not be neutral, since EDSI determined
the "pool of potential arbitrators." 20 Second, the fee structure was also unfair,
since it required an employee to pay one-half the arbitrators' fees as a
condition of arbitration. 21
However, the court was careful to make clear that an employer could
enter into arbitration agreements with its employees that encompassed
federal statutory claims, provided the arbitration agreement has sufficient
consideration. 22
1 4 1d. at311.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 316.
17 Id. at 314.
18 1d. at 315-16. "Though obligated to provide some type of arbitral forum, EDSI
has unfettered discretion in choosing the nature of that forum .... EDSI's right to choose
the nature of its performance renders its promise illusory." Id.
19 Id. at 314.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 316 ("An employer may enter an agreement with employees requiring the
arbitration of all employment disputes, including those involving federal statutory claims.
Yet an employer cannot seek to do so in such a way that leaves employees with no
consideration for their promise to submit their disputes to arbitration.").
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]III. DISCUSSION
A. Gilmer: A Judicial Embrace of Arbitration Agreements for
Statutory Claims
In 1991, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether claims
brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA)2 3 were subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement in an
employment dispute.24 Finding the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)25
applicable, the Court held that statutory claims, such as those under ADEA,
could be subject to mandatory arbitration agreements. 26 The Court held that
such arbitration agreements should be enforced unless "'Congress itself has
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue."' 27 The intentions of Congress may be found in the
text of the statute, the statute's legislative history, or in an "inherent conflict"
between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes. 28 The Court noted
that even if a statute is found to be subject to arbitration agreements under
such an evaluation, the arbitration agreement must still be evaluated for
validity under contract law.29
B. The Application of Gilmer
Although Gilmer dealt solely with statutory claims under ADEA, the
federal circuit courts have applied Gilmer's holding to find arbitration
agreements enforceable for other federal statutory claims,30 such as those
23 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
24 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
25 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
26 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
27 Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
28 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
29 Id. at 33. "Thus, arbitration agreements are enforceable 'save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' Id. (quoting FAA, 9
U.S.C. § 2). "'Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power
that would provide grounds "for the revocation of any contract .... Id. (quoting
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627).
30 See infra Part III.B.
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under Title VII,31 the Truth in Lending Act (TLA),32 the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act (EFTA),33 the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),34
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),35 the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA),36 and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).37
For example, the Second Circuit recently held that statutory claims under
Title VI138 could be fairly resolved under arbitration and are subject to
mandatory arbitration agreements. 39 The Third Circuit came to a similar
conclusion in Johnson v. West Suburban Bank and compelled arbitration of
TILA and EFTA claims, even though arbitration would prevent the plaintiff
from bringing a class action suit.40 The Tenth Circuit also enforced a
mandatory arbitration agreement but in the context of claims under ERISA.41
The First Circuit held that ADEA ahd Title VII claims were generally
subject to mandatory arbitration agreements but found the specific arbitration
agreement at issue to be unenforceable. 42 The Eleventh Circuit also found a
particular arbitration agreement to be unenforceable but still concluded that
31 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994
& Supp. IV 1998).32 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
33 Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
34 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
35 Employee Income Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
36 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
37 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
3 9 Desiderio v. NASD, 191 F.3d 198, 206 (1999). In Desiderio, the plaintiff refused
to sign an employment contract that included a mandatory arbitration provision and sued
under Title VII and constitutional claims. Id. at 200. The court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of her complaint, holding that Title VII disputes could be fairly resolved
in an arbitral forum. Id. at 206.
40 Johnson, 225 F.3d at 378-79. The court concluded that the right to bring a class
action suit was not found within TILA itself, but that it was instead merely a procedural
right that need not be protected from arbitration under Gilmer and the FAA. Id. at 371.
41 Williams v. Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758 (10th Cir. 2000). The court applied the FAA,
which under Gilmer is applicable to individual employment agreements, to determine that
the ERISA claims in question were subject to the mandatory arbitration agreement. Id. at
764.
4 2 Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,, 170 F.3d 1, 4 (lst Cir.
1999). The court held that Merrill Lynch had not given the plaintiff sufficient notice that
she would be giving up her right to bring statutory claims in a judicial setting. Id. at 20-
21.
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TILA and ECOA claims were generally subject to arbitration.43 The Sixth
Circuit joins these circuits with its holding in Floss, described above.44
IV. CONCLUSION
With Floss, the Sixth Circuit has joined several other circuits in
following the Supreme Court's holding in Gilmer to find arbitration
agreements in the context of federal statutory claims enforceable. This is
evidence of acceptance by the lower federal courts of the positive attitude
towards arbitration that has been advanced by the Supreme Court45 and by
Congress. 46 It will be important to see whether the other circuits will follow
suit.
Shoshana R. Pehowic
43 Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 178 F.3d 1149 (1lth Cir. 1999). The
court ruled that the arbitration agreement failed to ensure that the plaintiff could vindicate
her statutory rights, since there was the potential for steep filing fees, steep arbitrators'
fees, and other potentially high costs to arbitration under the system imposed by the
arbitration agreement. Id. at 1158.
44 See supra Part II.
45 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
4 6 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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